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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Steven Shepherd appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion 
when it relinquished jurisdiction over him or, in the alternative, when it failed to further 
reduce his sentence upon relinquishing jurisdiction. He also contends that the grounds 
of appeal make out a colorable need for the inclusion of the transcript of the July 17, 
2003, sentencing hearing in the appellate record, such that, even under the Idaho 
Supreme Court's recent opinion in State v. Brunet, _ Idaho _, 2013 WL 6001894 
(2013), reh'g denied, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny his motion to 
augment the record with that transcript violated his constitutional rights to due process 
and equal protection. As a result, this Court should grant Mr. Shepherd access to the 
requested transcripts and allow him the opportunity to file supplemental briefing raising 
any issues arising from review of those transcripts. 
In the event that request is denied, this Court should still vacate the district 
court's order relinquishing jurisdiction over Mr. Shepherd and remand this case for an 
order placing him on probation. Alternatively, this Court should either reduce his 
sentence as it sees fit or remand the case so the district court can reduce his sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In 2003, Mr. Shepherd pied guilty to one count of sexual abuse of a child, sixteen 
or seventeen years of age. (R., pp.9-10, 44-45, 48-49.) The district court imposed a 
unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, though it suspended that sentence 
for a ten-year period of probation. (R., pp.55, 57-58.) Nine years later, the State filed a 
motion to revoke Mr. Shepherd's probation. The district court held an evidentiary 
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hearing on that motion, and found that Mr. Shepherd had violated his probation. (R., 
pp.150-54.) 
In preparation for disposition on the probation violation, the district court ordered 
an updated presentence investigation report (hereinafter, PSI). That report indicated 
that the issues underlying Mr. Shepherd's violations stemmed from a bout with 
depression following his divorce, as well as being denied access to the addiction 
recovery program offered through his church. (PSI, pp.4-5.) 1 It also revealed that the 
2003 conviction was Mr. Shepherd's first felony offense, and that he only had one other 
misdemeanor offense on his record. (PSI, pp.5-6.) However, the PSI noted that Mr. 
Shepherd had repeatedly violated the terms of his probation during the course of his 
probation. (PSI, p.6.) For example, he admitted to viewing pornography on several 
different occasions. (PSI, p.6.) The PSI mentioned that Mr. Shepherd had ongoing 
support from family and friends, and that he suffered from depression. (PSI, pp.8, 13, 
22-29.) Considering all this information, the presentence investigator recommended 
that the district court revoke probation and retain jurisdiction over Mr. Shepherd. (PSI, 
p.16.) 
The State concurred with the recommendation for a period of retained 
jurisdiction. (Tr., Vol.2, p.2, Ls.16-18.)2 Defense counsel argued that, since 
Mr. Shepherd had served eight and one-half months in custody after being arrested on 
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file 
"ShepherdPSI." Included in this file are the PSI report and all the documents attached 
thereto (police reports, addendum from rider staff, etc.). 
2 The transcripts in this case were provided in two separately bound and paginated 
volumes. To avoid confusion, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume containing the transcripts 
from the probation violation hearing held on May 10, 2012, and the rider review hearing 
held over the course of two days (February 28, 2013, and April 3, 2013). "Vol.2" will 
refer to the volume containing the transcript from the disposition hearing held on August 
30, 2012. 
2 
II 
I' . .. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
the allegation of probation violation, Mr. Shepherd should be returned to probation 
instead. (Tr., Vol.2, p.11, L.2 - p.12, 3.) The district court decided that it would revoke 
Mr. Shepherd's probation, but, in recognition of Mr. Shepherd's efforts during his nine 
years on probation, it would retain jurisdiction while he participated in the rider program. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.14, Ls.23-25; R., pp.156-58.) 
Subsequently, the rider staff provided an addendum to the PSI report 
(hereinafter, APSI), which evaluated Mr. Shepherd's performance during the rider 
program. (PSI, pp.84-88.) The staff recommended that Mr. Shepherd be returned to 
probation. (PSI, p.84.) The APSI noted that Mr. Shepherd had demonstrated 
amenability to treatment and had completed all his assigned programs. (PSI, p.85.) 
It informed the district court that Mr. Shepherd had received no disciplinary sanctions, 
formal or informal, during his period of retained jurisdiction. (PSI, pp.85-86.) The 
appended Sex Offender Risk Assessment also concluded that Mr. Shepherd presented 
a low risk for sexually-based recidivism and a low-moderate risk for overall recidivism. 
(See PSI, pp.89-90; Tr., Vol.1, p.156, Ls.3-11.) However, the APSI also indicated that 
Mr. Shepherd's performance during the rider program was not at the highest level. 
(See, e.g., PSI, p.86 ("Staff reported that Mr. Shepherd was not an overly driven 
individual to go above and beyond, but that they had no reason to let him go.").) It also 
noted that he was, at least, hypersensitive, if not purposefully disruptive, during some of 
the programs, which negatively impacted his treatment group. (PSI, p.87.) Despite 
those issues, the staff ultimately recommended his release back to probation, 
concluding: 
Mr. Shepherd has completed all of the assigned program. He has not 
been a disciplinary problem while at NICI. He was able to articulate 
ownership for his behavior and thinking which led to his violating his 
probation. Mr. Shepherd is an emotionally immature man. He will 
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continue to struggle with blaming others for his poor choices and the bad 
outcomes. 
(PSI, p.88.) 
The district court expressed concerns about the APSI report and the propriety of 
its recommendation, given some of the comments in the narrative, which suggested to 
the district court that Mr. Shepherd was still minimizing his behavior. (Tr., Vol.1, p.100, 
Ls.2-5.) As such, it found the recommendation for probation to be "totally contradictory 
almost with the facts as reflected in the treatment notes." (Tr., Vol.1, p.110, Ls.10-13.) 
Therefore, it continued the hearing so that the authors of the report could be present 
and offer testimony as to their recommendation. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.100, L.14- p.104, 
L.4.) 
At the subsequent review hearing, Naomi Laurino and Bryan Gimmeson offered 
testimony regarding their recommendation in the APSI. Ms. Laurino testified that, while 
Mr. Shepherd was not pushing himself in the program, he had not performed so poorly 
as to be determined "not amenable" to treatment efforts. (Tr., Vol.1, p.123, Ls.3-18.) 
However, she testified that she did not think he would be successful on probation. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.124, Ls.14-22.) To that end, Ms. Laurino testified about the approach that 
the Idaho Department of Correction (hereinafter, IDOC) has in regard to rider staff's 
recommendations when a defendant is finished with a rider program. Her testimony, 
read alongside that offered by Mr. Gimmeson, indicates that IDOC's policy is to not 
incarcerate people unnecessarily, to give them the benefit of the doubt, and therefore, 
to not recommend relinquishment unless there is "[a] DOR,3 some overt acting out." 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.121, Ls.3-6.) Ms. Laurino testified that this approach was based on 
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IDOC's a desire to have "zero growth within the populations,"4 and so the rider staff was 
supposed to be "very judicious in who we recommend for relinquish[ment]." (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.121, Ls.15-23.) Mr. Gimmeson explained that incarcerating defendants in this 
situation risks losing the opportunity to rehabilitate them, and instead, turn them into 
"better criminal[s]." (Tr., Vol.1, p.148, Ls.1-5.) 
Mr. Gimmeson testified that his recommendation that Mr. Shepherd be returned 
to probation was based on the fact that Mr. Shepherd had participated in the program, 
doing what he was supposed to do (though he did point out that he would have 
preferred to see a higher level of participation from Mr. Shepherd). (Tr., Vol.1, p.147, 
L.14 - p.148, L.5.) Therefore, given his evaluation of Mr. Shepherd's risk level for 
recidivism - low for sexually-based recidivism and low-moderate for overall recidivism 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.156, Ls.3-11) - Mr. Gimmeson concluded that Mr. Shepherd "would be 
better served in the community environment to go treatment versus go to prison .... " 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.148, Ls.2-5.) 
Mr. Gimmeson also described an alternative treatment option - the moderate risk 
sex offender program available at the "Institutional Idaho Correctional Institute of 
Orofino [sic]" or ICIO facility. 5 (Tr., Vol.1, p.148, L.6-p.149, L.10; Tr., Vol.1, p.151, 
Ls.16-22.) However, the only way for Mr. Shepherd to gain access to that program was 
to have the district court relinquish jurisdiction or to commit a new sex offense. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.150, Ls.1-5.) Nevertheless, Mr. Gimmeson did not feel a recommendation 
3 A formal disciplinary report. 
4 Ms. Laurino also suggested that this policy was the result of the fact that "we're out of 
space in the prison." ( See Tr., Vol.1, p.121 , Ls.15-23.) 
5 According to Mr. Gimmeson, this program was a longer term program than the rider 
program and functioned more like a community with reduced risk factors (i.e., reduced 
access to pornography), and as such, and was more able to deal with issues, such as 
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for relinquishment was appropriate, since Mr. Shepherd did not have serious behavioral 
problems and because he thought Mr. Shepherd could be successful on probation, 
despite the possibility that he could struggle at times during the course of such a term of 
probation. (Tr., Vol.1, p.150, L.25- p.151, L.14.) 
The district court decided that the evidence presented demonstrated insufficient 
progress in rehabilitation to justify a period of probation, and so, it relinquished 
jurisdiction over Mr. Shepherd. (Tr., Vol.1, p.182, L.5 - p.183, L.24.) However, the 
district court did exercise its authority under I.C.R. 35 and reduced Mr. Shepherd's 
sentence from a unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, to a unified 
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed. (Tr., p.185, L.24- p.186, L.10; R., p.171.) 
It also recommended that Mr. Shepherd be placed in the ICIO program. (Tr., Vol.1, 
pp.10-13.) 
Mr. Shepherd filed a notice of appeal which was timely from the order 
relinquishing jurisdiction. (R., pp.166-68.) On appeal, he moved to augment the record 
with transcripts from three hearings: the entry of plea hearing held on April 17, 2003, 
the sentencing hearing held on July 17, 2003, and the admit/deny hearing held on 
March 22, 2012. (Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and 
Statement in Support Thereof, filed September 17, 2013.) The Idaho Supreme Court 
denied that motion. (Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule, dated October 15, 2013.) 
mental health concerns, in the overall treatment process. (Tr., Vol.1, p.148, 
L.12 - p.149, L.10.) 
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1. 
2. 
ISSUES 
Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Shepherd due process and equal 
protection when it denied his motion to augment the record with transcripts 
necessary for review of the issues on appeal. 
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction 
over Mr. Shepherd, or, alternatively, by not further reducing his sentence when it 
did so. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Shepherd Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With Transcripts Necessary For 
Review Of The Issues On Appeal 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently considered when indigent defendants are 
entitled to transcripts prepared at state expense on appeal. Brunet , _ Idaho _, 
2013 WL 6001894. Its opinion reaffirmed the existing standard of review, which is that, 
when reviewing decisions such as the decision to relinquish jurisdiction, "this Court 
conducts an independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at 
sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment." Id. at 4 (citing State v. 
Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010)). The Idaho Supreme Court also recognized that there is 
a federal and state constitutional requirement for the State to provide transcripts 
sufficient for an adequate appellate review. See id. at 2-3 ( citing Mayer v. City of 
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971); State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457,462 (2002)). 
That requirement is part of the guarantees in the United States Constitution and 
the Constitution of the State of Idaho that criminal defendants shall have due process 
and equal protection under the law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. art. I, § 13. 
Essentially, due process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiterv. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of Durham City, 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981); Card, 121 Idaho 
at 445. Those same standards have been applied to article I, section 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution. Maresh v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 
221, 227 (1998). 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether 
transcripts must be provided to indigent defendants when such a right is established. 
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See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)6; Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); 
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 494-95 (1963); Mayer, 404 U.S. 189. Its decisions 
have established two fundamental themes. First, the scope of the due process and 
equal protection clauses is broad. Second, disparate treatment of indigent defendants 
is not tolerable. As a result, the State must provide an adequate record for appellate 
review, but that record need not include frivolous or unnecessary materials. See, e.g., 
Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195. 
As a result, the Idaho Supreme Court held that, in order to show that the 
transcript requested is necessary for an adequate appellate review, the party moving for 
its inclusion in the record "must make out a colorable need for the additional 
transcripts.''7 Brunet,_ Idaho_, 2013 WL 6001894 at 3; but see Mayer, 404 U.S. 
6 In Griffin, the United States Supreme Court held: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitions from invidious 
discriminations. 
Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
7 "It is well established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate 
record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... 
and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to 
support the actions of the trial court."7 State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999); 
see also Mowrey, 128 Idaho at 805 (applying this presumption in absence of a complete 
record). Therefore, if Mr. Shepherd fails to provide the appellate court with the 
transcripts necessary for review of his claim, this legal presumption will apply and 
Mr. Shepherd's claims regarding the relinquishment of jurisdiction will not be addressed 
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at 195 ("where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable need for a 
complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the 
transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds"). 
The grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for the transcript of the 
sentencing hearing held on July 17, 2003.8 The minutes of that hearing only indicate 
Mr. Shepherd "[a]ddresses the Court." (R., p.55.) The minutes do not reveal the 
contents of that address. (See generally R., pp.54-55.) When a defendant makes a 
statement of allocution at a sentencing hearing, those comments are relevant to the 
sentencing determination. See, e.g., State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 
2003), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 887-88 (Ct. 
App. 2013), rev. denied, (finding that, while allocution is important, it does not rise to the 
level of a constitutionally protected right, as the opinions in Gervasi and other cases had 
suggested). Additionally, the record indicates that the father of the victim made a 
statement to the district court. (R., p.54.) The minutes of the hearing do not reveal the 
on their merits. In effect, that presumption (a result of the Idaho Supreme Court not 
affording him access to relevant transcripts) would deprive him of an effective appeal, 
making the appeal constitutionally invalid on due process and equal protection grounds. 
See Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-85 (1963) (holding that it is "constitutionally 
invalid ... to prevent an indigent from taking an effective appeal") (emphasis added). 
Alternatively, if it is state action alone which prevents the defendant from having 
access to the necessary items, because such action is a violation of equal protection 
and due process, any such presumption should no longer apply. See, e.g., id. at 485. 
In this situation, the foregoing presumption should be reversed, and what occurred at 
those hearings should be presumed to discredit the district court's ultimate decision to 
relinquish jurisdiction because the district court obviously concluded at the sentencing 
hearing that the aggravating information was insufficient to justify incarcerating 
Mr. Shepherd, given the objectives of sentencing. See I.C. § 19-2521; State v. Merwin, 
131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998). 
8 Mr. Shepherd is not challenging the denial of his request for the transcript of the entry 
of plea hearing held on April 17, 2003, or the transcript of the admit/deny hearing held 
on March 22, 2012, in this appeal. 
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contents of that statement either.9 (See generally R., pp.54-55.) A victim impact 
statement is also a factor to be considered by the district court when it imposes a 
sentence. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST., Art. I, §22(6) ("A crime victim, as defined by statute, 
ahs the following rights: ... To be heard, upon request, at all criminal justice 
proceedings considering a plea of guilty, sentencing, incarceration or release of the 
defendant, unless manifest injustice would result.") Therefore, a transcript is necessary 
for the appellate court to evaluate the entire record available to the district court when it 
subsequently relinquished jurisdiction. See Brunet, _ Idaho _, 2013 WL 6001894 
at 4. 
Those statements are part of the record before the district court because the 
district court is entitled to rely the knowledge gained from its own official position and 
observations, and thus, it is actually expected to rely on its memory of prior proceedings 
in a case. See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also 
State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings of the trial judge 
in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the district court heard during trial); 
State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318, 321 (1977) (recognizing that the district court could rely 
upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed 
in the courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved"); 
State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing that the district 
court "naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events and considers 
9 Since the minutes do not reveal the contents of either statement, they are insufficient 
to provide an adequate appellate record in regard to Mr. Shepherd's challenge that the 
district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction, executing the 
sentence imposed at the July 17, 2003, hearing. Compare Brunet,_ Idaho_, 2013 
WL 6001894, p.3 (discussing how the minutes in the record of that case were sufficient 
to provide an adequate appellate record). 
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all relevant facts in reaching a decision"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct. App. 
1984) (noting that "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he already 
knew about [the defendant] from the other case"). Since the same district court judge 
who relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Shepherd also presided over the July 17, 2003, 
sentencing hearing (compare R., pp.54, 164, 170-71), the comments made by the 
victim's father and by Mr. Shepherd at the July 17, 2003, sentencing hearing are part of 
the record that was available to the district court when it relinquished jurisdiction over 
Mr. Shepherd. 
Therefore, because both statements impact the sentencing decision and were 
part of the record before the district court, there is a colorable need for the transcript of 
the July 17, 2003, sentencing hearing to be augmented to the record, so that the 
appellate court has an adequate record upon which to conduct its review of the entire 
record available to the district court when it relinquished jurisdiction and executed 
Mr. Shepherd's sentence. 10 See Brunet, _ Idaho _, 2013 WL 6001894 at 3. As 
10 In that same vein, an adequate appellate record is necessary to vindicate 
Mr. Shepherd's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Evitts 
v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (relying on Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 
355-56 (1963), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963)). Appellate 
counsel is required to make a conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in 
support of the best arguments to be made. See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 
U.S. 738, 744 (1967). The standards for effective appellate representation are set forth 
in the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense 
Function. State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989), overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,432 (1991). Specifically, Standard 4-8.3(b) provides: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
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such, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny Mr. Shepherd's request to augment 
the record with that transcript violates his constitutional rights to due process and equal 
protection. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over 
Mr. Shepherd, Or, Alternatively, By Not Further Reducing His Sentence When It Did So 
A. The District Court Erred When It Relinquished Jurisdiction 
The district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction is reviewed under an abuse 
I of discretion standard. State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 438 (Ct. App. 2011 ); 
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State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001 ). Such a decision will not be considered an 
abuse of discretion "if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a 
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate."11 State v. Merwin, 131 
Idaho 642, 648 (1998). "The purpose of retaining jurisdiction after imposing a sentence 
is to afford the trial court additional time for evaluation of the defendant's rehabilitation 
potential and suitability for probation." State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205 (Ct. App. 
1990). In making that determination, the district court "considers all of the 
In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate counsel can 
neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be presented on 
appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's decision to 
revoke probation, which is now at issue. Further, counsel is unable to advise 
Mr. Shepherd on the probable role the transcripts may play in his appeal. Therefore, 
Mr. Shepherd has not obtained appellate review of the court proceedings based on the 
merits of his claims and likely was not provided with effective assistance of counsel in 
that endeavor. 
11 The policy referred to by the rider staff members - to be judicious as to who receives 
recommendations for relinquishment (see, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.121, Ls.3-23) - is 
consistent with the approach that the Idaho Supreme Court articulated in Merwin, as 
well as the approach set forth by the Legislature: "The court shall deal with a person 
who has been convicted of a crime without imposing sentence of imprisonment 
unless . . . it is of the opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for protection of the 
public .... ") I.C. § 19-2521(1) (emphasis added). 
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circumstances to assess the defendant's ability to succeed in a less structured 
environment and to determine the course of action that will further the purposes of 
rehabilitation, protection of society, deterrence, and retribution." Statton, 136 Idaho at 
137. It is guided in this determination by I.C. § 19-2521. Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648. In 
this regard, the need to protect society is the primary objective the court should 
consider. See, e.g., State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). As such, a 
disposition that protects society and also accomplishes the other objectives 
(rehabilitation, deterrence, and punishment) will be considered reasonable. See id. 
This is because the protection of society is influenced by each of the other objectives, 
and therefore, each must be addressed in the disposition. See Charboneau, 124 Idaho 
at 500. 
There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether the 
objectives are served by a particular disposition. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 
320 (2006). They include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good character, 
status as a first-time offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to 
treatment, and support of family." Id. These factors are also embodied in the factors 
set forth in I.C. § 19-2521. Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis 
for a more lenient sentence in several cases. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 
489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991 ); 
State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 
Idaho 295, 301 (1990); and State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). In this case, 
several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently considered by the court as it 
made its disposition regarding Mr. Shepherd after he completed his period of retained 
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jurisdiction. A sufficient consideration reveals that Mr. Shepherd's performance during 
his period of retained jurisdiction, when combined with the mitigating factors present in 
his case, indicate that he should be able to succeed in a less structured environment 
and a disposition providing him with the opportunity to do so will still serve the 
objectives. Therefore, the decision to relinquish jurisdiction does not serve the 
objectives, and is an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
Mr. Gimmeson pointed out that Mr. Shepherd only presented a low-moderate risk 
for recidivism generally and a low risk for sexually-based recidivism. (Tr., Vol.1, p.156, 
Ls.3-11.) Sentences are to be crafted so that they do not force the prison system to 
continue detaining a person once rehabilitation or age has decreased the risk of 
recidivism. Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 
1988). The decision to relinquish jurisdiction and incarcerate Mr. Shepherd for up to ten 
years, despite the fact that he does not have a significant risk for reoffending means 
that the district court's decision operates contrary Cook and Eubank. As such, it 
constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
Additionally, the underlying offense was Mr. Shepherd's first felony offense and 
second offense overall. (PSI, pp.5-6.) The Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that 
the first offender should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal." 
Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595 (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled 
on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971)). This is because 
such a person does not yet have a fixed character for crime and so rehabilitation at this 
point is more likely. Owen, 73 Idaho at 402. Therefore, since this is Mr. Shepherd's 
first felony and he is not a habitual offender, the time to employ rehabilitative options is 
now. Timing is also an important consideration when addressing rehabilitation. See id.; 
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State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; Eubank, 114 Idaho at 
639. Furthermore, both rider staff members testified that Mr. Shepherd has 
demonstrated amenability to treatment. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.123, Ls.3-18; Tr., Vol.1, 
p.147, L.14 - p.148, L.5.) Thus, in order to take advantage of that amenability, timely 
rehabilitative efforts should be undertaken.12 
Furthermore, Mr. Shepherd has a support network in place. (See, e.g., PSI, 
pp.8, 22-29.) Family constitutes an important part of a support network, which can help 
in rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 817 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that 
familial support offered to affirm the defendant's innocence does not equate to familial 
support offered in consideration of rehabilitation, implying that had the support been 
offered for rehabilitation, it would be a mitigating factor worthy of consideration). In 
addition, Mr. Shepherd has demonstrated that he can and will provide service to his 
community, as he has served in the Army and the National Guard. (See PSI, p.156 
(Mr. Shepherd's discharge papers, indicating he was honorably discharged in 1999); 
Tr., Vol.1, p.65, Ls.24-25 (indicating that Mr. Shepherd served in the National Guard 
from 1999 through 2004).) In fact, Mr. Shepherd suffers a ten percent disability as a 
result of his service. (PSI, p.109.) A good record of military service is another factor 
which should be considered in mitigation. State v. Ogata, 95 Idaho 309, _, 508 P.2d 
141, 144 (1973); State v. Bolen, 143 Idaho 437,441 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Finally, as the PSI pointed out, the violations of the terms of probation which led 
to Mr. Shepherd's period of retained jurisdiction stemmed from a bout with depression 
12 As Mr. Gimmeson suggested, not taking advantage of this opportunity and 
incarcerating Mr. Shepherd risks losing the opportunity to rehabilitate Mr. Shepherd, 
and instead, turn him into a "better criminal." (Tr., Vol.1, p.148, Ls.1-5.) That result 
would actually provide less protection for society, since Mr. Shepherd will be released 
from incarceration at some point in the future. 
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following his divorce, as well as being denied access to the ARP program offered 
through his church. (PSI, pp.4-5.) Idaho Code § 19-2523 not only suggests, but 
requires, the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor. 
See Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). If Mr. Shepherd was suffering a 
depressive episode, as the PSI suggests (see PSI, pp.4-5), that could impact his 
performance during the rider program. Furthermore, his behavior on probation prior to 
that episode was mostly laudatory, evidenced by the fact that there were no motions for 
probation revocation filed for nine years. That suggests that, when Mr. Shepherd has 
his depression under control, he is more capable of being successful on probation. 
That supports Mr. Gimmeson's conclusion that, while Mr. Shepherd might have some 
struggles with probation, ultimately, he is likely to be successful on probation. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.151, Ls.10-14.) 
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that a suspended sentence, 
which considers rehabilitation, would still address all the other objectives - protection of 
society, punishment, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 713 (1993) 
(requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing objectives). When a 
sentencing court suspends a sentence and orders probation, it still imposes and 
executes a sentence. Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the 
imposed sentence are still present. See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 
(Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the 
sentencing objectives and how the court's continuing jurisdiction affects those 
objectives). In addition to restricting his liberty at the discretion of the Board of 
Correction and the looming sentence, he would also be deprived of several of his rights 
(such as the right to possess a firearm), since this is a felony offense. Furthermore, the 
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district court would retain the ability to revoke probation and execute the original 
sentence if Mr. Shepherd were to fail to adhere to the terms of his probation. However, 
it could do so knowing that all the sentencing objectives properly addressed. What the 
probationary period would provide that a term sentence would not is the opportunity to 
rehabilitate in a real-world setting, allowing Mr. Shepherd to apply the lessons he would 
gain in out-patient treatment in a practical setting. 13 
B. Alternatively, The District Court Erred When It Did Not Further Reduce 
Mr. Shepherd's Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35 When It Relinquished Jurisdiction 
Even if the district court did not abuse its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction, it 
did abuse its discretion by not further reducing Mr. Shepherd's sentence, sua sponte, 
pursuant to Rule 35 when it did so. After a defendant has completed a period of 
retained jurisdiction, the district court may suspend the sentence, which results in the 
defendant being placed on probation, or it can resume the execution of the underlying 
sentence. State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 264 (Ct. App. 2003). If the district court 
decides to resume the execution of the underlying sentence, it also has the authority to 
reduce the sentence, sua sponte, pursuant to Rule 35. Id.; see also State v. Timbana, 
145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008) (applying the same rule to the decision to the similar 
situation of probation revocation). 
The decision to not reduce a previously-pronounced sentence will be reversed on 
appeal if it constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion. State v. Hanington, 
148 Idaho 26, 27 (Ct. App. 2009). The standard of review and factors considered in 
13 While the district court did recommend Mr. Shepherd's participation in ICIO's sex 
offender program, the final determination on what, if any, rehabilitative programming an 
inmate receives while incarcerated is left to the Department of Corrections. See, e.g., 
State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931 (2005). As such, this recommendation does not 
ensure continued rehabilitative opportunities to the same degree a period of probation 
would. 
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such a decision are the same as those used for the initial sentencing. Id. (citing among 
others, Toohi/1, 103 Idaho at 568). Therefore, the district court needed to sufficiently 
consider the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating factors in the 
record. See id.; Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. A failure to do so should result in a 
more lenient sentence. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90; Shideler, 103 Idaho at 
595. 
While the district court did reduce the total fixed time Mr. Shepherd would be 
required to serve when it relinquished jurisdiction, it should have gone further. In 
addition to the factors discussed in Section ll(A), supra, a further reduction of the 
sentence was also merited by Mr. Shepherd's completion of nine years of his period of 
probation without a reported violation and his successes during the rider program. All 
three of these factors demonstrate that Mr. Shepherd was working to comply with the 
rules while under the State's supervision, and his successes in that regard deserve 
recognition. Recognition of Mr. Shepherd's successes in this manner actually improves 
the likelihood that future rehabilitative opportunities will be successful, and therefore, 
better promotes the ultimate protection of society. Otherwise, as Mr. Gimmeson pointed 
out, all the district court's decision to incarcerate does is put Mr. Shepherd in a situation 
where he is more likely to become a "better criminal." (Tr., Vol.1, p.148, Ls.1-5.) 
Therefore, to promote the overall protection of society, the district court should have 
further reduced Mr. Shepherd's sentence when it revoked his probation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Shepherd respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the 
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise 
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Shepherd respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate the order relinquishing jurisdiction and remand this case 
for an order placing him on probation. Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce 
his sentence as it deems appropriate, or remand the case for a reduction of sentence 
pursuant to I.C.R. 35. 
DATED this 10th day of February, 2014. 
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BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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